CONCEIVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR AN ASIAN
ENVIRONMENT
David C. Donald*
Nearly all Chinese corporations are vehicles used by a
separate system or social network—such as a family, a state, or a
political party. Available data show a similar pattern in other Asian
countries. The challenges presented by the corporation operating as
a system within a system are in most instances ignored by the modern
business corporation structure and related doctrine. This is just as
true under Chinese and Hong Kong law as under that of the United
States or the United Kingdom. The dominant model of corporate
governance understands the company as a vehicle in which financial
investors and operational management coexist for the sole purpose
of profit. Other systematic relationships among persons operating
the corporation are recognized only as potential sources of power
and information asymmetries that exploit financial investor
constituencies. This ignores both data on who owns most companies
and a deep body of empirical scholarship demonstrating the
advantages enjoyed by family enterprises—from profitability and
longevity to lower executive compensation and transaction costs.
This Article uses institutional and systems theory tools to
begin development of a model of corporate governance dynamics that
takes real account of the systems that coexist with the corporate
vehicle. It uses the initial examples of the family and the political
party to propose a corporate structure in which social networks and
value systems can meaningfully communicate with the governance
rules of the corporation.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT

A.

Governance Rules Focus on Individuals and Their Interests

The governance rules of corporate law seek to align the
interests and behavior of individual corporate actors in a way that best
serves a company’s economic performance. 1 This is achieved by
using duties to frame decision-making, specifying permitted and
prohibited acts, requiring disclosure, and creating a series of
incentives and disincentives for corporate actors.2 Governance rules
use increasingly sophisticated techniques to channel the interests of
individual players, but they are not designed to interact with entire
networks of institutionally channeled interaction that are present in a

1

While arguments about the exact definition of corporate governance abound, the
general goal expressed above corresponds to what is found both in codes formulated by
public bodies and in scholarly analysis. See, e.g., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE Preamble 11 (2004) (stating that “[c]orporate governance involves a set of
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives
for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.”); JONATHAN R. MACEY,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 1 (2008) (stating that
“corporate governance is about reducing deviance by corporations where deviance is defined
as any actions by management or directors that are at odds with the legitimate, investmenthacked expectations of investors. Good corporate governance, then, is simply about keeping
promises. Bad governance (corporate deviance) is defined as promise-breaking behavior.”);
MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 203–204 (2003)
(stating that “[c]orporate governance can be analyzed solely in terms of the inner workings
of the corporation: the mechanical requirements for the board of directors, the degree to
which minority stockholders are protected from insider machinations . . . [But] [f]or
corporate governance, the [major sources of influence] are labor markets, politics, and
capital and product markets.”); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (1976) (stating that “[c]orporate law is constitutional
law; that is, its dominant function is to regulate the manner in which the corporate institution
is constituted, to define the relative rights and duties of those participating in the institution,
and to delimit the powers of the institution vis-à-vis the external world.”).
2 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 37–39 (2d ed. 2009) (stating that these strategies can be
organized into a schema as appointment rights, decision rights, agent incentives, agent
constraints and affiliation terms).
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corporation’s environment.3 The only exception to this characteristic
of corporate law design is the network of the financial system, the
needs of which are deeply imbedded not only in the design of the
corporate shares’ transferability, 4 but also in rules on management
and shareholder behavior when operating, and particularly when
financing, the company.5 Other systematic networks of values, such
as the family or the state, actively define relationships among the
owners of most corporations, 6 but corporate law does not adjust
specifically to take them into account as useful systems. Ethical
frameworks like those found in “corporate social responsibility”
(CSR) or “corporate sustainability” also present value systems that
could define relationships among corporate actors, but these positions
are recognized at most through disclosure requirements, with no
integration into company operation other than by appeals to investor
preference and an ethical belief that one can “do well” financially by
“doing good.”7
3

The environmental factors on which this paper focuses can be thought of as a system
of values or ‘motivation matrix’ that assigns incentives and its own unique functional values
to objects or actions. It can be understood either objectively (a matrix of values established
systemically) or subjectively (a matrix of value choices made by a member of the system,
qua member). The values determined in one system may overlap with those fixed in other
value systems or may differ therefrom. For example, the profit motive enshrined in the
system of company law will correspond to a key drive of either the family or the state when
using the corporate form.
4 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) (explaining that a primary function of limited liability, the most
unique characteristic of the stock corporation, is to allow free transferability of shares).
5 As a company moves closer to the capital market (from private to public or closely
held to widely held) and is eventually listed, corporate law allows major changes to take
place to the company’s board structure, the decision-making prerogative of shareholders,
and the structure of its share capital. These changes are seen as not only acceptable, but also
necessary because linking into the financial system is understood to be a completely natural
and desirable aspect of the company’s existence.
6 Figures on family firms and state owned corporations are discussed in detail in Part
III, Section A. The special problems of corporate groups could also benefit from the
systematic analysis offered here. The major tension of a group is that the systematic drive
of the group’s aims straddles individual companies and can come into conflict with corporate
law as it applies to such companies.
7 Empirical studies have indeed shown that socially directed investment can be
profitable. See, e.g., JACOB GRAY ET. AL, WHARTON SOCIAL IMPACT INITIATIVE OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (WSII), GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MISSION PRESERVATION AND
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN IMPACT INVESTING (2015), https://socialimpact.wharton.
upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-Expectations-Mission-Preservation-andFinancial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DYJ-BHEF] (explaining
that socially directed investment can be profitable). However, this does not in any way affect
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Not only do networks of value like the family greatly
determine interpersonal relationships in most companies, but it has
been shown repeatedly that they make tangible contributions to
corporate operations.8 The presence of such systems is, however, at
best taken into account in a cosmetic way (disclosure on CSR) and at
worst condemned in advance as dangerous (family ownership equals
crony governance). The family is understood primarily as an
impediment to the corporation’s fair and efficient operation. State
ownership is seen as an impediment to a corporation’s profitability,
and ethical or social goals are generally tolerated to the extent that
they do not disrupt the drive to profit. This exclusion can occur
without notice because very little effort is made to grasp how the
corporation interacts systematically with its real environment. For
example, if a corporation were used as a vehicle for a family business,
the matrix of family values might well attribute importance to an end
like “promotion of autonomous family control,” but corporate law
could alternatively categorize the actions serving this end as abusive
entrenchment, so that a key aim of the family-held corporation would
be condemned a priori as illegitimate.
The regulatory thrust of corporate law is to bring individual
interests of corporate actors into sync with the network of assigned
corporate roles and tasks.9 Regardless of whether a given interest
derives from a network of values having great social importance, if
the interest has not yet been brought within the set of individual
interests made legitimate through corporate law, it will come under
consideration for sanction. The main stated aim of penalizing such
action is to protect shareholders or minority shareholders from abuse,
but there is no reason to doubt that this aim could be achieved even
when corporate law takes into account the complexity of its real
environment. Currently, most corporate governance rules are
designed to single out and exorcise individual actions of corporate
the design of corporate law to offer a vehicle in which individuals may pursue profit by
collective action through the proxy of the corporate vehicle.
8 Part III, Section A of this Article contains a discussion of such factors.
9 Affirmative powers, such as the right to call or vote at a meeting, or to allot shares
or enter into a business combination, are assigned in ways to allow efficient operation of the
company while respecting a balance of power within the company; whereas, duties of care
and of loyalty (in the United Kingdom, the fiduciary duty) direct behavior to the good of the
company and its members. See, e.g., the discussion of agency problems and legal strategies
in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 39–49.
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players if they are seen as in conflict with the company’s (or
shareholders’) good. 10 This occurs regardless of whether such
actions derive from competing networks of significant importance for
society, or even for the long-term existence of the company—such as
the family, a political party, a religion, a philosophy of CSR, ethical
investing, or some other grid of norms. These alternative networks
taken as a whole remain alien to the fabric of corporate law, and they
are informally assigned values ranging from cosmetic to disruptive
and even to sinister.11
Only specialized studies, such as those on the “family firm,”12
make any attempt to incorporate the interests that arise from
competing value systems within the defined dynamics of corporate
law. Otherwise, the motivations generated by such value networks
are simply excluded or subjected to disclosure, and perhaps sanitation,

10 Conflicts of interest and potential conflicts of interest (related-party transactions) are
the target of the fiduciary duty (in the U.K. tradition) and the duty of loyalty (in the U.S.
tradition). The conflict arises between a duty to the company (or its shareholders) and a
personal interest of the corporate actor (director or controlling shareholder in the United
States), and such personal interests will include the interests of related parties, such as family
members of the corporate actor. See, e.g., ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD,
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: TEXT AND CASES ON THE CORPORATE LAWS OF GERMANY,
THE UK AND THE USA 332–368 (1st ed. 2010) (containing a discussion of the duties and
related cases).
11 Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 510
(1999) (stating that “[f]amily control may facilitate corruption because it gives the
controlling shareholders enormous autonomy in decision making, keeps the potential
whistle-blowers out of major corporate decisions, and thus reduces the risk of getting caught.
According to this theory, family control is especially important in the most corrupt
countries.”). On state control, see RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD
OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 9–10 (2010) (“The modern world is replete with examples
of elite networks that wield behind-the-scenes power . . . The United Kingdom had the ‘old
boy network’ . . . France has ‘les énarques’ . . . Japan has the Todai elite . . . None can hold
a candle to the Chinese Communist Party, which takes ruling-class networking to an entirely
new level. The ‘red machine’ [internal telephone] gives the party apparatus a hotline into . . .
the government-owned companies that China promotes around the world these days as
independent commercial entities.”).
12 For example, articles published in the Family Business Review or texts such as
MORTEN BENNEDSEN & JOSEPH P.H. FAN, THE FAMILY BUSINESS MAP (2014) and SABINE B.
KLEIN, FAMILIENUNTERNEHMEN: THEORETISCHE UND EMPIRISCHE GRUNDLAGEN (2d ed. 2004)
incorporate in very different ways particular aspects of family relationships into the
operation of stock corporations, but in doing so clearly see family firms as a particular subset
of corporations. Similar treatment for firms owned by a parent in a related industry and tied
by supply contracts or firms owned by a parent in an unrelated industry as part of a
diversified group are not viewed with a like level of cottage peculiarity.
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in their individual appearances.13 Given the obvious presence (if not
dominance) of such value systems within corporations and their
potential contribution to corporate operations, 14 they should be
brought expressly within corporate governance theory. This paper
outlines one avenue to that end by using a systems theory analysis to
frame a common ground on which to conceive, as “systems,” both
the company as a product of corporate law and the value networks
that may strongly influence the relationships among company actors.
The example this Article has chosen for beginning this undertaking
is the Asian company, given the historical, cultural and economic
circumstances that have led to a prominent position for either the
family or the state in many Asian corporations, large and small.
There is good reason for using both the family and the state
(or political party) as two main examples of value networks to be
integrated into corporate governance, and limiting analysis to those
two systems. In their histories, these two value systems have often
been diametrically opposed politically after the fall of dynastic
royalty—the powerful families were no friends of state power, and
communist governments in particular made great efforts to purge the
royal and bourgeoisie families from a prominent role in the
economy.15 By examining them both, this paper abstracts away from
a single social phenomenon or political stance and formulates a
scheme of corporate governance that allows an entire system of
values to be integrated into that system we call corporate governance.
Once this framework has been set out, it will facilitate a next step into
less traditional value systems, such as philosophies of CSR or
corporate sustainability. The aim of this analysis is to provide a
systemic view of company law that allows it to interlock with its
environment. This is undertaken in an apolitical way, completely
agnostic as to whether wealthy families, a socially engaged state, or
profit-seeking investors should take stewardship of an economy.
13 Criteria for independence applied to directors filter out those with family ties to an
interest to be avoided, and disclosure of related-party transactions ensure that intersections
with an alternative value network like a family are made known. Both are discussed in Part
IV.
14
See infra the discussion in Part III.
15 SHEILA F ITZPATRICK, EVERYDAY STALINISM 142 (1999) (quoting, “In the 1920s,
Communist attitudes toward the family were often hostile. ‘Bourgeois’ and ‘patriarchal’
were two words often coupled with ‘family.’ The conventions observed by respectable
society before the revolution were dismissed as ‘petty-bourgeois philistinism.’”).
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This would allow an opening of corporate law to various
environments, well beyond the financial system, which currently
presents the company’s most legally acceptable matrix of use,
purpose and design.16
B. Coupling Companies and Other Systematic Networks
In developing a resourced-based analytical model to isolate
and evaluate the effect on corporate performance of control by a
family, Habbershon and Williams summarize the need to understand
how the two systems of “family” and “firm” interact and also note the
incentives pushing corporate law to simply exclude the exogenous
network from the inner workings of the firm:
There is also the broader problem of connecting
complex behavioral and social phenomena within
family businesses to traditional performance criteria.
The systemic relationship between the family and the
business creates categories of organizational behavior
that are not easily identified as components of value
creating strategies. It appears easier to ignore or rid
the firm of the complexity, rather than address the
sources of complexity as a potential for advantage.17
When corporate law ignores or flatly prohibits influence from
the complex networks of motivations found in groups operating a
firm, it takes the simpler route; however, this strategy merely turns a
blind eye to motivations that are not only present in most companies,
but can also lower transaction and agency costs within the firm. 18
16 As will be discussed in Part IV, Section A.2, the corporate form and rules of
corporate law have been generously adjusted over the last century to facilitate the connection
between the company and the financial system. Connection to and influence by the financial
system is not seen as external to the company and in any way dangerous—as would be
ownership by a family or the state—but rather a feature that enlivens the company and brings
it to itself.
17 Timothy G. Habbershon & Mary L. Williams, A Resource-Based Framework for
Assessing the Strategic Advantages of Family Firms, 12 FAM. BUS. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
18 This paper focuses primarily on the rules of corporate governance found in U.S. and
U.K. law, with additional specific reference to Hong Kong (which greatly resembles the
United Kingdom). It could be argued that German law does a better job of allowing
alternative networks to coexist within the firm, and codetermination is just one example of
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Leading jurisdictions have been prepared to alter the form of the
business corporation in many ways, such as to optimize tax treatment
with limited liability companies or allow sole proprietors to
incorporate alone.19 Thus, it is more than just a little unusual that
through roughly 200 years of modern corporate history,20 no concrete
steps have been taken toward creating a system of company
relationships that seriously engages the operative environment of
business corporations.
When the management of a corporation is understood as a
collection of individuals whose interests must be aligned to that of
the company (or its shareholders, qua investor) or be excluded,
factoring in networking systems from the environment is difficult,
even if such systems are employing the company as a vehicle for their
business. An individual is not a network of values but can interact
with other actors within one. The lack of a systematic approach
linking the company and the systems that affect relationships among
its members abstracts away from real actors and posits hypothetical
individual corporate actors with a pure profit drive. The real actors
as found in the environment from which they originate are then
supposed to have tendencies to engage in self-interested
transactions 21 or make unwise decisions diverging from the profit
incentive.22 If, as estimates show, most companies are incorporated
for use by a family or the state, it is inappropriate that such use of the
such systematic inclusion. The proposals offered in this paper remain within the framework
of U.S., U.K., and Hong Kong law and do not tack onto the many attempts to bring German
principles or constructs into the “Anglo-American” corporate law model.
19 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Making Sense of Entity Rationalization, 58 BUS. LAW.
1023 (2003) (explaining rationalizations behind the emergence of limited liability
companies).
20 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1393–95 (2006) (stating that the New York General Incorporation Act of 1811 can be
seen as the first modern corporate law).
21 Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, THEORY AND PRACTICE 391, 405 (2004) (arguing that trust among the
family members, which is essentially a network effect of the family, leads to rent-seeking
and corruption in a family firm, so that “[p]rofessional managers with brief careers might be
socially preferable to enduring family control over large corporations.”).
22
MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 101. McGregor discusses with disparaging amusement
how executives of China’s state owned enterprises were not permitted to cash in the
“windfalls of millions of dollars through options granted to them after offshore listings,” as
they were rather forced to pledge such profits to the state if they wanted to move up in the
communist party hierarchy.
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corporate form should trigger suspicion of abuse. Moreover, at least
with regard to family firms, numerous studies have shown that the
family network influences company operations in beneficial ways,23
so ignoring such networks or excluding them from corporate law
probably damages the enterprise. Corporate law should provide a
coupling that preserves the operational nature of both the
environmental network of values (such as a family) and, in particular,
those corporate governance rules designed to stop the corporate form
from becoming an arena for extracting rents and abusing outside
investors.
Systems theory is the natural tool to bring the systems of
corporate law on the one hand, and intersecting networks of values
and motivations (like the family or the state) on the other hand, into
interoperable coordination. 24 Luhmann, in particular, has offered
valuable theoretical insights on how both law and society function as
separate and self-generating systems that are linked dynamically.25
Luhmann isolates certain legal concepts and examines their function
using the term “structural couplings,” as they link law to its larger
social environment.26 For example, items important in society, such
as land, money, and technology, are linked to legal systems through
the concept of property in the form of leases, negotiable instruments,
and patents. The legal concepts take their shape from the needs of
the real, social phenomena, and the social forms of possession and
transfer of these phenomena take shape according to the conceptual
structure of the legal system. Luhmann’s configuration of the
23

Primarily because family control tends to mean a long-term business outlook,
reduced transaction costs in the company among members of the family network, and
reduced agency costs due to informal bonding arising from family relationships. For a
discussion of the effects of families on firms, see Part III, Section A.
24 Timothy G. Habbershon, Mary Williams & Ian C. MacMillan, A Unified Systems
Perspective of Family Firm Performance, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 451, 453 (2003) (“For
nearly 2 decades, the two or three overlapping circles models . . . have been the standard
theoretical models for picturing family and business as interlinking systems that explain the
competitive tensions in strategy making.”). See also James J. Chrisman et al., A Unified
Systems Perspective of Family Firm Performance: An Extension and Integration, 18 J. BUS.
VENTURING 467 (2003) (extending and integrating the theoretical contributions of
Habbershon et al. by substituting value creation for wealth creation as the defining function
of family businesses).
25 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT [LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM]
550 (1993).
26 Id. at 440–495.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol12/iss2/1

98

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

“structural coupling” is a good framework for expressly recognizing
systematic networks of social values intersecting with and inside of
corporate law. Existing concepts in corporate governance can be
adjusted and new concepts can be formulated to give legal substance
to real systems of relationships defining interactions among corporate
actors.
C. Adjusting Corporate Governance to the Asian Social
Environment
While the available, largely estimated data shows family
firms are dominant globally, with approximately half of U.S.-listed
companies, and about 60% of all European businesses, controlled by
families,27 there are good reasons why Asia is an appropriate starting
point for a project opening corporate governance to environmentally
prominent networks of values. First, family firms are statistically
more prevalent in the Asian private sector than they are in the West.28
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the history of Asia diverges
from that of the West in ways that have left the ancient importance of
the extended family relatively intact.29 Third, Asian countries have
without exception imported their corporate law. The models were
originally developed in Western countries and transplanted
voluntarily, through colonization, or following military victory.30 As
27 Global Data Points, FAM. FIRM INST., http://www.ffi.org/?page=globaldatapoints
[https://perma.cc/GS9C-5HUS] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
28 Family firms constitute an estimated 85% of China’s private enterprises and about
79% of “organized private sector employment” in India. Id.
29 As will be discussed in Part III, Section B, history shows that Christianity in Europe
did much to dissolve the power of ancient clans over the individual as a holder of rights,
which freed the individual for primary membership in other organizations, such as the early
corporations operating municipalities and guilds.
30 On the transplantation of corporate law into mainland China, see JIANGYU WANG,
COMPANY LAW IN CHINA 3–7 (2014) (discussing a brief history of China’s company law).
On the transplantation into colonial Hong Kong, see DAVID C. DONALD, A FINANCIAL
CENTRE FOR TWO EMPIRES: HONG KONG’S CORPORATE, SECURITIES AND TAX LAWS IN ITS
TRANSITION FROM BRITAIN TO CHINA 104–169 (2014) (discussing the development of Hong
Kong’s corporate and securities laws as a response to Hong Kong being China’s international
financial center). On the shaping of Japanese company law following World War II, see
Bruce Aronson, Postwar Reform of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
Democratization under the Occupation and the Japanese Reaction, in LAW AND PRACTICE
IN POSTWAR JAPAN: THE POSTWAR LEGAL REFORM AND THEIR INFLUENCE 59 (International
House of Japan & Blakemore Foundation eds. 2010) (discussing two opposing views on the
necessity and success of reforming of Japanese corporate law in 1950); see also Hideki
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such, they have a law that did not grow out of their social institutions.
Fourth, given the current point of China’s economic development in
its transition away from a fully planned economy, most of China’s
globally significant firms are state owned enterprises (SOEs). As will
be discussed in Part III, Section C, the Central Personnel Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) controls executive
appointments and career advancement in these SOEs. For these
reasons, the project of integrating actual networks of values from the
social and political environment into corporate governance can
favorably begin with Asia.
A good specimen of corporate law on which to focus while
attempting to link environmental systems to the system of corporate
governance is that of Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s company law
originated in and remains very close to that of the United Kingdom,
both in statutory and common law elements.31 U.K. law was passed
to most of Britain’s colonial network, has significant similarities to
that of the United States, and has influenced E.U. company law.
Hong Kong company law therefore presents a good example of the
global standard for corporate law, making it one of the world’s most
important commercial laws. The economy of Hong Kong is
dominated by companies controlled either by families or the People’s
Republic of China (PRC),32 so that abstract corporate doctrine of the
detached individual engaging in the company to pursue personal
profit is closely juxtaposed with the reality of value networks
determining much of the behavior of corporate actors. Regulators
and lawmakers are aware that the socioeconomic character of Hong
Kong does not always match the governance model codified in
corporate law and have made some small adjustments to the standard
corporate law model. 33 However, Hong Kong company law and
Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary
Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887 (2003) (discussing the role of legal
transplants in corporate law by examining Japan’s transplantation of the director’s duty of
loyalty).
31 For a history of the development of Hong Kong company law, see DONALD, supra
note 30, at 22–33 (discussing the foundations of Hong Kong’s legal system), 111–22
(discussing law transplanted only as the need arose).
32
See DONALD, supra note 30, at 62–101 (explaining the ownership of the largest
companies in the major segments of Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index).
33 For example, the Model Articles for Public Companies provide for the possibility of
a “managing director” who may be appointed without being subjected to future elections and
may be given powers equal to those of the entire board, to the exclusion of the powers of the
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listing rules mirror international standards in large part by focusing
on individuals and linking external value networks to conflicts of
interest. Where this Article offers recommendations in the context of
a specific body of corporate law, it will use Hong Kong law as a case
study.
Following this introduction, Part II will present the tools used
in this Article’s system theoretic analysis. Part III examines the
problem of companies operating at the intersection between corporate
law and two major systems of roles and values, the family and the
CCP. The first section of Part III will review existing scholarship on
the family within the operation of corporations. The second section
of Part III will discuss the way in which the roles and duties of the
CCP enter into the operation of a corporation. Part IV will then
examine the very limited way in which modern corporate governance
theory interacts with major value systems operating in the
environment, such as the financial system; systems of professional
skills applied to assessment of the director’s duty of skill, care, and
diligence; and the equitable considerations that trigger a case of unfair
prejudice. Part V will develop some workable structural couplings
with which corporate governance can be fruitfully linked to networks
of values that influence corporate actors within a firm. Part VI will
offer conclusions.

II.
A.

COUPLING SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND CORPORATE LAW
From Individual to Network: Rendering Corporate Law
User-Friendly

The company form is mostly used by families, the state, or
political parties. The typical rules of corporate governance do not
expressly prohibit company officers from bringing into the company
interests they hold from membership in alternative environmental
value systems. Motivations from such exterior sources are, however,
essentially ignored unless they conflict with the perceived interest of
the company or that of the shareholders qua investor (not as, say, a

other board members. Hong Kong Model Articles for Public Companies, arts. 33–34 (2013)
http://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20131721/es22013172177.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DTL
-2JL8].
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family member or employee), in which case they are condemned.34
This is not surprising because law as a whole centers greatly on
creating and enforcing rights and duties of individuals.35 However,
the corporation always operates as a group, even if only a minimal
group of one physical and one legal person; at the other end of the
spectrum, the group can become very large.36
Moreover, corporations are vehicles through which to
conduct business activity; they are not ends in themselves. The law
enabled the creation of corporations to facilitate the activity of groups
of people for their interaction with the world.37 As the aggregation
34 There is a significant difference between corporate law traditions in the United
Kingdom and the United States on this point. Although the corporate law of the United
States uniformly recognizes companies as separate entities, most states consider them to be
somewhat porous when assigning duties, so that directors’ duties flow through the company
employing the director to the shareholders behind it. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (ruling that in the event of an
inevitable takeover, the director has a duty to achieve the best price for the shareholders). In
the U.K. tradition, the company’s status as an entity is applied with more doctrinal coherence,
so that a director’s duties run to the company for which she serves as director and with which
she has an employment contract. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (U.K.)
[hereinafter Companies Act 2006] (adding a more porous element of “promote the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole” to the traditional formulation).
35 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 269 (Paul Craig ed. 3rd ed. 2012) (stating “legal
rights and duties are the point at which the law with its coercive resources respectively
protects individual freedom and restricts it or confers on individuals or denies to them the
power to avail themselves of the law’s coercive machinery.”).
36 The very name “company” (Gesellschaft, societé, societá, ޜਨՊ⽮) indicates a
social aspect, an association creating an enclosed society with its own set of rules. This
aspect of companies is plainly visible from both historical and theoretical vantage points.
The first companies chartered by the British crown operated as quasi-autonomous
governments in colonies from North America to Asia. See, e.g., Janet McLean, The
Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today? 79 IND. L.J. 363, 367–75 (2004)
(discussing the early successes of the English East India Company and other overseas trading
corporations). From a conceptual perspective, German companies fall under the genus of
club (Verein) or association. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that corporations
should enjoy a certain level of protection for their exercise of political and religious rights.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). However, neither decision delves into the nature of the
company in a rigorous way.
37 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The
Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 877, 891–99 (2016) (arguing that a corporation is a collection of many individuals,
united into one body, with the capacity of acting particularly of taking and granting property,
of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and
immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, according to the design
of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it).
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of capital was a central function of the corporation, corporate law
does recognize the authority of the financial system as a network of
values beyond corporate law that may legitimately affect the
company.38 The interest of an investor is only very rarely understood
to be in conflict with the interest of the company. Exceptions are also
made for networks of values created in professions related to the
decision-making of corporate officers, such as accounting, risk
management, or business planning. The values espoused in these
professional cultures are both used by courts to flesh out the skill,
care and diligence duty applied to company directors and can also
define the interest of the company.39 Excluded value systems like the
family are acknowledged primarily in the form of rules, checking
motivations that might derive from them. This is accomplished by
prohibiting or requiring disclosure and sanitation of individual
decisions taken under the influence of such systems. The
motivational assumption running in the background of modern
corporate governance theory is that an individual profit motive
aligned with that of the company should drive the interests of
company participants.40
38 The key needs of the financial system are built into stock corporations: the
transferability of shares makes a liquid investment possible, corporate personality with
limited liability reduces the volatility of a company’s value even when its ownership changes
through the trading of its shares, and the rules of corporate governance are designed to make
risk manageable, placing great stress on protecting minority shareholders (who are financial
investors) and creditors. See infra Part IV, Section A.2.
39 The manner in which these exterior value systems are brought into corporate law is
examined in Part IV, Section A.
40 This aspect of corporate law is so self-evident that it is rarely called out. However,
an examination of law shows it is true of motivations whether they are viewed in a positive
or a negative light by corporate law. In regulating conflicts of interest, Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) § 144 refers to a “director’s or officer’s [individual] relationship
or interest,” and when specifying standing to demand a fair price for shares in connection
with a corporate combination this law refers to “any [individual] stockholder of a
corporation.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 144, 262 (2013) [hereinafter DGCL]. Companies
Act 2006 § 175(1) also refers to the individual director: “he has, or can have, a direct or
indirect interest that conflicts” with that of the company. Companies Act 2006, supra note
34, § 175(1). Although the right to petition for relief against unfairly prejudicial action refers
to the members generally, it is the individual rights of each member that are indicated (“the
company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial
to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members”). Companies Act 2006,
supra note 34, § 994(1)(a). Although German law does refer to the management board
(vorstand) as a collective (Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act] § 76–77), it still deals with
interests of individuals, such as in the noncompetition requirement expressed in § 88, the
duty of care expressed in § 91, and the annual decision to approve behavior (entlasten)
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The result of this framework is that modern governance rules
seek to hold the self-interests of corporate actors in check when they
conflict with an operation of the company that is conceived to reap
profit (whether immediately or through a visible causal chain).
Through the work of Jensen and Meckling, efforts spent to control
divergences between individual interest and the company’s (or
shareholders’) interest are understood under the concept of “agency
costs.”41 During most of the 20th century, the work of Berle and
Means led scholars to focus on an agency problem between
shareholders and the self-interested control of management. 42 At
least since the 1990s, it has been generally known that the “Berle &
Means corporation,” defined by the characteristic of central
management dominating dispersed shareholders, is not the global
norm.43 During the 2000s, Kraakman et al. consolidated the theory
of agency costs across the varying ownership structures found in
major world economies, formulating a highly authoritative
contemporary theory of comparative corporate law.44
expressed in § 120. Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl at 1089, as
amended, § 76, § 77, § 88, § 91, § 120 (Ger.).
41 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976).
42 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 84 (1932). On the question of dispersed shareholding, see, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson
& Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (arguing that equity
ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share ownership of the
canonical Berle-Means firm and explaining the reason of the reconcentration of ownership
in the hands of institutional investment intermediaries, which gives rise to “the agency costs
of agency capitalism.”); Brian R. Cheffins and John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011) (explaining the rise of
hedge funds as practitioners of offensive shareholder activism); John C. Coffee Jr., The Rise
of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership
and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 37–39 (2001) (arguing NYSE’s role of guardian of the public
investor, and it imposed high listing standards for its own self-interested reasons and tracking
how NYSE became identified with mandatory listing conditions that protected “shareholder
democracy” and prevented the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights.).
43 As was noted in a well-known study published in 1999, “If we look at the largest
firms in the world and use a very tough definition of control, dispersed ownership is about
as common as family control. But if we move from there to medium-sized firms, to a more
lenient definition of control, and to countries with poor investor protection, widely held firms
become an exception. Berle and Means have created an accurate image of ownership of
large American corporations, but it is far from a universal image.” La Porta et al., supra
note 11, at 498.
44 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–37.
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This theory shows how the agency costs dynamic can be
applied robustly to the relationship resulting from any kind of
delegated authority, 45 including that between directors and the
company (or shareholders), between controlling and minority
shareholders (power delegated by means of the majority control rule),
or between shareholders and creditors (power delegated by the fact
that creditors remain corporate outsiders despite providing the
company with cash).46 In each case, governance rules are designed
to mitigate the risks from a situation in which an agent constituent
might try to serve his or her own self-interest to the detriment of the
principal constituent, which may or may not be the company itself.
Self-interest extends to interests of members within a value system,
typically the family but also a related firm, to which the relevant
corporate actor is also connected.
Differing political goals written into corporate law and
differing socioeconomic circumstances can lead to different
behavioral goals being ascribed to corporate actors.47 For example,
if it is decided that the purpose of a company is to maximize profits
for the benefit of shareholders, then power can be given to
shareholders and competing interests are restricted.48 On the other
45 As Jensen and Meckling noted in 1976, “agency costs arise in any situation involving
cooperative effort (such as the co-authoring of this paper) by two or more people even though
there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship.” Jensen & Meckling, supra note 41, at 309.
46 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 37–53.
47 Proving this point has been a central focus of the comparative corporate law work of
Mark Roe. See ROE, supra note 1, at 3–5 (aiming to find a deep, important and missing
political explanation for the rise of the large firm and the separation of ownership from
control). Another important contribution on this topic is CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA
PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008) (“We . . . use corporate governance
as a lens through which to view a much larger set of institutional phenomena in a given
country and to analyze, as rigorously as possible, the relation between the legal system and
the portion of the economic system that is directly related to firms’ structures and
governance.”).
48 Profit maximization for the benefit of shareholders is an object found strongly
represented in the “nexus of contracts” theory of corporate law. See, e.g., FRANK
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991)
(“[T]he corporate contract makes managers the agents of the equity investors but does not
specify the agents’ duties. To make such an arrangement palatable to investors, managers
must pledge their careful and honest services.”). The applicability of this understanding to
Delaware law has recently been convincingly reaffirmed. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers
of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability
Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
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hand, if the object of a company is to thrive generally as an
“undertaking,” power can be distributed among key corporate
constituencies and shareholder primacy restricted.49 If we eventually
join the very peculiar view of the U.S. Supreme Court that conceives
the corporation as a person enjoying the same protection as any other
person—free of prejudice arising from the fact that it can be called
artificial—civil and human rights can be attributed to the company.50
The only limits to this exercise are those provided by the political
climate and respect for the internal coherence of legal doctrine. These
allocations of rights to privileged constituencies will be created by
assigning duties to other corporate actors to respect such rights. Thus,
law ascribes duties to members of the board of directors and
controlling shareholders in connection with the power they receive
over the company from corporate law arrangements.51 Duties of care
761 (2015) (examining the argument that directors have no legal obligation to make the
promotion of stockholder welfare their end under Delaware law).
49 Pursuant to § 76(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act, the managing directors
have a duty to manage the company, “in the interest of the undertaking” (interesse des
unternehmens or unternehmensinteresse), which is understood as constituted by a pool of
interests from shareholders, employees, creditors and the community. HANS-JOACHIM
MERTENS & ANDREAS CAHN, KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, § 76, at 33–37 (3rd
ed. 2010). This aggregated undertaking theory also underlines that the company ‘in itself’
is not seen as having an interest. FRIEDRICH KÜBLER & HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN,
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT:
DIE
PRIVATRECHTLICHEN
ORDNUNGSSTRUKTUREN
UND
REGELUNGSPROBLEME VON VERBÄNDEN UND UNTERNEHMEN 178 (2006). The view of the
company as an arrangement that serves and mediates the interests of a number of
constituencies is also found in the United States, under the corporatism model promoted in
the 1950s and in the “team production” model promoted in the late 1990s by Blair and Stout.
Cheffins presents an excellent history of ideas analysis of the evolving views of the
corporation in the United States. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a
Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 397 (2015) (drawing upon key corporate law theories and
trends to offer insights concerning their model and showing team production theory is
unlikely to achieve paradigmatic status within the realm of corporate law theory).
50 This is a potential direction the U.S. Supreme Court is moving when it declares that
“the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.”
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The German constitution
takes a similar view. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic
Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 19(3) [hereinafter GRUNDGESETZ].
51 Although not identical to the duties assigned to a trustee, the underlying structure is
the same, and the duties reflect the legitimate claims of the persons who should benefit from
the agent’s action. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002) (crafting a unified theory of fiduciary duty, in which fiduciary
relationships form when one party (the fiduciary) acts on behalf of another party (the
beneficiary), where the “on behalf of” requirement describes relationships in which one
person acts primarily for the benefit of another).
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and loyalty serve to bend directors’ potentially self-serving behavior
toward the diligent and faithful management of the company for the
benefit of the entity or its constituents.
In this way, comparative corporate scholarship has brought us
to the point where governance mechanisms can be adjusted both to
different manifestations of agency problems and to variations of
corporate purposes, whether for profit maximization of shareholders
or the benefit of a broader association of corporate constituencies.
Despite this versatility, corporate governance generally presupposes
that the moving force within a corporation is the individual profit
incentive, whether in the form of executive compensation, capital
gains and dividends, reliable payment of interest and principal, an
enduring and fairly compensated employment relationship, or stable
contracts of supply. Governance mechanisms are designed to allow
profitable operation of the entity as a unit while safely channeling the
individual actors’ drives for self-gain, with each actor exercising
delegated power on behalf of the entire company or another
constituency. Declaring motivations other than profit is not entirely
foreign to corporations, as the “mission statements” of many
companies evince, 52 but they are cosmetically added to the
governance framework, not made integral to its operation. When the
interaction of shareholders and executive managers is largely
determined by values from an environmental system of values they
share and they have taken recourse to the company form in order to
52

The year before Volkswagen AG was embroiled in what was perhaps history’s most
innovative premeditated fraud of environmental regulation, its Chairman proudly (or
cryptically) announced in the company’s annual report that, “[o]ur pursuit of innovation and
perfection and our responsible approach will help to make us the world’s leading automaker
by 2018—both economically and ecologically.” VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2014). At the height of a period—as it was later determined by courts—
in which Volkswagen bribed its board labor representatives with extravagant parties and
prostitutes to obtain their support for management initiatives, its Chairman wrote proudly
(or cryptically) under the heading “Group Values,” that “the art of good leadership is to give
employees yardsticks by which they can measure the soundness of their own decisions, and
to urge them to make use of that freedom.” VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT ANNUAL
REPORT 14 (2003). The criminal proceedings on the first set of charges were concluded in
January 25, 2007 with the decision of the District Court of Braunschweig, 6th Criminal
Chamber (docket no. 48/06). For details on the scandal in English, see Dietmar Hawranek
et al., Scandal at Volkswagen: With Prostitutes and Shady Executives, There’s No Love Left
in this Bug, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 18, 2005), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
spiegel/scandal-at-volkswagen-with-prostitutes-and-shady-executives-there-s-no-love-leftin-this-bug-a-365752.html [https://perma.cc/JU3Y-YVJH].
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carry out ends grounded in such system, ignoring this fact renders
corporate law defective and ill-suited to its task.
B.

Systems Theory Provides the Necessary Coupling Concepts

When the law governing the most important organizational
form in business ignores the most prominent societal value systems
that use such a form, there is a serious gap between law and reality.
The abstraction presupposed in law pulls individuals out of their
environment—a system of values that may have the shape of their
activity later brought into the corporate form. Although this system
of values may be the primary determinant of how corporate actors
relate to each other, corporate law will either ignore the actor’s
relationship to this network or condemn it as a source of conflicted
interest. To correct this situation, the process of abstraction must be
reversed so that the individual corporate actor can be understood
within both the corporation and the concrete matrix of motivations
that place the actor in the corporation. This can be done by shifting
from law’s traditional focus on the individual to an analysis of
systematic relationships. Concepts borrowed from systems theory as
applied to law provide a workable bridge for this transition.
Systems theory has been used for decades to study the
operation of family businesses. 53 Deakin and Carvalho have also
mapped out a system theoretic approach to company law that is
wholly complementary to institutional studies, employing the
theoretical framework developed by Niklas Luhmann.54 In an early
work on systems theory, Luhmann explains why a successful
governance analysis must look beyond individual conflicts of interest
to the action of alternative motivational matrices:
Classical organization theory contains many problems
and tends to attribute the fault for this to individuals,
particularly members of organizations condemned of
53 See Trevor Hopper & Andrew Powell, Making Sense of Research into the
Organizational and Social Aspects of Management Accounting: A Review of Its Underlying
Assumptions, 22 J. MGMT. STUD. 429 (1985) (providing an initial survey of the use of
systems theory for the study of family firms in management studies).
54 Simon Deakin & Fabio Carvalho, System and Evolution in Corporate Governance,
at 7–8, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 150/2010) http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1581746 [https://perma.cc/UZ9Q-V6T9].
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not disclosing conflicts of role (duties). In this way,
problems deriving from the relationship between the
system and its environment are written off to
weakness of character.55
While corporate law theory is built upon addressing conflicts
of interest, it has never set out to confront entire systems of values
and motivations arising from networks within society as they
intersect with the corporation.
In his later work, Luhmann revisited this problem, and
borrowed concepts from biology to conceive portals between the
systems of law and society in the form of “structural couplings,”
which he distinguishes from “operative couplings,” with the former
being constant and the latter event-specific. 56 In an operative
coupling, a given event in one system impacts and takes on value in
another system (e.g., a transfer of money extinguishes an obligation),
while in a structural coupling, “a system continuously presupposes
specific characteristics in its environment and structurally depends
upon them” (e.g., using money to settle debts presupposes the legal
nature of money). 57 Structural couplings serve as enduring and
selective portals between systems because they “limit and in this way
facilitate environmental influences on the system,” 58 like the
membrane of a cell that absorbs only ions that are beneficial for the
cell’s development and rejects all others as unneeded or damaging.
Luhmann understands the legal concept of “property” as an
essential coupling between the systems of “economy” and “law”
because property “eliminates the need for consensus” in dealing with
the social object, so “for the consequences of certain actions the
owner’s consent alone is sufficient.”59 In this way, Luhmann agrees
with other prominent theorists in understanding the definition of
property rights as a component of transaction costs,60 but his focus is

55

NIKLAS LUHMANN, ZWECKBEGRIFF UND SYSTEMRATIONALITÄT 73–74 (Suhrkamp
Verlag ed., 6th ed. 1999) (author’s translation).
56 LUHMANN, supra note 25, at 441.
57
Id. (author’s translation).
58 Id. (author’s translation, emphasis added).
59 Id. (author’s translation, italics omitted).
60 See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
28 (1990) (“The total costs of production consist of the resource inputs of land, labor, and
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on the manner in which the link is channeled rather than its value to
the economic system.
Luhmann explains the manner of communication between
systems through analogy to the “irritations” and “surprises” an
organism might experience in its environment. 61 When the social
system “irritates” the legal system through a “surprise” that the legal
system is designed generally (though not specifically) to foresee, law
will not respond automatically—transforming input to output—but
instead process this irritation according to its own internal rules.62
Both the social system and the legal system will “simultaneously”
register the irritation, but there will be a lag time in the law’s reaction
to the stimulus processing of the “surprise,” so that the two systems
are not “synchronized.” 63 Whether the legal and social systems
eventually line up with each other will determine the presence or
absence of “corruption”:
All conceivable pressures deform law, whether they
ignore it and circumvent the applicable law or whether
they cause the system case by case to call the legal
illegal or the illegal legal. Without structural
couplings in the relationship between subsystems of
society, law remains corrupt, in the modern sense of
the word . . . . The more fundamental question is,
rather, which structural couplings in relation to other
subsystems can make it possible for corruption to be
displaced and simultaneously environmental
influences to be reduced and—aided by the
coupling—increased.64

capital . . . and in transacting—defining, protecting, and enforcing the property rights to
goods”).
61 LUHMANN, supra note 25, at 442.
62 Id. at 442, 453. The manner in which systems interact, but stabilize themselves
internally is made evident in Luhmann’s conceptual definition of rule of law. While the
legal enforceability of a transfer of money has a real importance in the economy, it must be
something “that cannot be paid for” (unbezahlbar), so that the two systems communicate but
remain independent (author’s translation, italics omitted).
63 Id. at 442.
64 Id. at 445.
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The corruption that occurs when law and society are out of
sync is corrected by structural couplings that allow the two systems
to communicate, so that the social activity creating the irritation can
adjust law. Imagine an arrangement where A takes control of B’s
property with B’s consent but without purchasing title to it, and
behaves openly as the property’s owner, transferring to B the fruits
earned from the property. This apparent corruption of the ownership
relationship can be repaired through either the property law concept
of “trust” or the contract law concept of “agency,” both of which
would have specific constitutive elements that facilitate and limit
their use.
As discussed in the previous section, no structural coupling
has been designed to allow those major value networks (such as
family or state) that use the corporate form to communicate
effectively with corporate law and eliminate the corruption which
occurs in both the social systems and corporate law when the two
systems interact. On the contrary, corporate law has created rules on
conflict of interest that are triggered if an individual corporate actor
belongs to a family in which another member is dealing with the
company through that actor. Neither the aim of the secondary system
nor the corporate actor’s duty to it are understood as relevant to the
conflict of interest analysis. 65 Preventing influence by such value
systems is considered a best-practice stopgap against evasion,
undertaken to protect the interests of outside investors so they can
place funds into a company without fear of abuse by insiders. 66 The
absence of a workable coupling between the systems that control
most companies and the law according to which these companies
operate appears to be a choice that has been made in favor of
designing the company for insertion into the financial market despite
most companies’ actual needs. 67 The securities market requires
65

The Hong Kong Companies Ordinance brings family relationship in at a number of
points to attribute the interests of family members to the corporate actor. Hong Kong
Companies Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 622, §§ 281, 486, 667, 674) (H.K.) [hereinafter HKCO].
66 The ability to attract such outside investors is then ultimately enshrined as a key
element of economic development. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997).
67 The costs of external finance were clearly explained as early as Stewart C. Meyers,
The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575, 581 (1984). A recent view, apparently based
on insights from the official study of the U.K. equity markets which John Kay led, can be
found in JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE OR SERVANTS OF
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fungible units of value that can be traded knowing that their issuer
has a single purpose fungible to other issuers to act in such a way that
these units of value increase in price. The decision to conceive the
corporation as a financialized entity forms the basis for much of
traditional corporate governance scholarship.68

III.

TWO COMMON VALUE NETWORKS THAT USE THE
CORPORATION: FAMILY AND THE STATE
A.

Family Firms: Loyalty Transcending Contract

Of the value networks in the social environment that might
co-exist with a company, perhaps the most common is the family.69
Family firms70 are widespread, if not dominant, in most economies.
The Family Firm Institute (FFI) gathers data from a number of
sources (including Harvard Business School and KPMG) to provide
the following estimates on the portion of economic activity
represented by family firms:

THE PEOPLE?

(2015) (“Stock markets are not a way of putting money into companies, but a
means of taking it out . . . . While railways, car manufacturers and brewers needed additional
funds to build new plant as they expanded, new companies today—such as Apple or
Google—commonly become generators of cash, rather than users, early in their lifetime.”).
68 See supra discussion in Part IV, Section A.2.
69 A potential competitor for this title might be the corporate group. If simple groups
are included, such constellations of companies are indeed common. Corporate groups also
can have an overall purpose that has systemic value and cannot be boiled down to a single
group company. Because the members of the group are individual companies, however, it
differs from the kind of system under analysis in this paper, where members of the (family
or state) system are also corporate actors with specific duties. Nevertheless, it is worth
undertaking a parallel systemic analysis for the special ways in which groups make use of
the corporate form. See, e.g., the extensive treatment of these questions in PHILLIP I.
BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS (2d ed. 2004).
70 The definition of “family firm” varies among scholars and jurisdictions, but generally
includes elements of both family control and family management. In this paper, the concept
of family firm used accommodates the varying specifics of different definitions and
corresponds to the recent observations of the European Economic and Social Committee:
“It is generally accepted that family businesses can be characterized within three circles:
families, businesses and ownership structure. The impact of the family on the other two
circles determines the family nature of the company. This impact means that family
businesses are more complex than their non-family counterparts.” See, e.g., EUROPEAN
ECON. AND SOC. COMM., FAMILY BUSINESSES IN EUROPE AS A SOURCE OF RENEWED GROWTH
AND BETTER JOBS (2015), http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.34702
[https://perma.cc/U58M-FY5N].
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In the United States, at least half of all
companies and just over half of listed
companies;
In Europe, approximately 60% of all
companies;
In China, approximately 85.4% of private
sector enterprises; and
In India, approximately 79% of organized
private sector employment.71

As the oldest and most prevalent social organization, the
family has its own organizational logic. Hirschman, in Exit, Voice
and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States, uses family as his primary example of an organization where
there is a high degree of loyalty. 72 Because the family is an
organization in which socialization begins at birth and continues (at
least nominally) until death, it has the potential to exhibit an intense
unity that far outstrips that arising from ad hoc employment positions
or membership stakes in a stock corporation. This characteristic is
evident in firms of all dimensions, from the neighborhood restaurant
to family empires like that of the Rothschild73 or Walton families.74
This systemic logic of the family as an organization gives
family firms certain recurring characteristics. These include
71 Global Data Points, FAM. FIRM INST., http://www.ffi.org/?page=GlobalDataPoints
[https://perma.cc/CF89-K2JB] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). When compiling this data, FFI
uses the definition formulated by Miller et al.: “Family Firm[s] [are those] in which multiple
members of the same family are involved as major owners or managers, either
contemporaneously or over time.” Danny Miller et al., Are Family Firms Really Superior
Performers?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 829, 836 (2007). See also Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth
of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377 (2009); International
Family Enterprise Research Academy, Family Businesses Dominate, 16 FAM. BUS. REV. 235
(2003) (providing further data that presents a stronger presence of family firms).
72 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 77–78 (1970).
73 “[T]he history of the firm is inseparable from the history of the family: the phrase
‘the House of Rothschild’, which has been used by previous historians (and film-makers)
was used by contemporaries, including the Rothschilds themselves, to convey this unity.”
NIALL FERGUSON, 1 THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY’S PROPHETS: 1798–1848 (1998).
74 There are too many differences between the rise of Rothschild banking in 19th
century Europe and that of Walton retailing in 20th century America to achieve any more
with this reference than a reminder that the family firm can take many different shapes yet
retain its familiar nature.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

2016]

CONCEIVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

113

generally recognized features, such as a pronounced drive for both
longevity and autonomy of the firm, 75 in which the effect of the
family as an organization independent of and with a timeframe
different from the company becomes visible as such. The family
itself will be as long-lived as its progeny and will remain genetically
distinct, so that its presence within the company structure will tend to
drag the corporation in the direction of these two characteristics.
From a systemic point of view, longevity and autonomy are
predictable characteristics of a company that contains a controlling
family. The particular characteristics of the family as an organization
can also lead to another common trait of family firms, which is a
concerted effort to preserve a specific culture, 76 something many
non-family firms attempt to project as well.
Other features of family firms are less well-recognized.
Broad-based empirical studies of large firms have shown that founder
controlled family firms significantly outperform non-family firms in
terms of profitability, particularly when founders are heads of the
board.77 Other studies, discussed below, show how the independent
network of the family coexisting with the company’s governance
framework supplements and supports management. Looking at
Chinese firms, Amit et al. found that when external institutions are
poor, the presence of family ownership adds significant value to a

75 See, e.g., Thomas Markus Zellweger et al., From Longevity of Firms to
Transgenerational Entrepreneurship of Families: Introducing Family Entrepreneurial
Orientation, 25 FAM. BUS. REV. 136, 136–51 (2012); G.T. Lumpkin et al., Long-Term
Orientation: Implications for the Entrepreneurial Orientation and Performance of Family
Businesses, 22 ENTREPRENEURSHIP & REGIONAL DEV. 11–24 (2010); Timothy G.
Habbershon et al., A Unified Systems Perspective of Family Firm Performance, 18 J. BUS.
VENTURING 451, 452 (2003).
76 Bennedsen and Fan recount how the Mulliez family created an academy to train its
family members for the business over a 100-year period, distilling the culture of the group’s
founder and passing it on to family members to run the firm of some 175,000 employees.
BENNEDSEN & FAN, supra note 12, at 2, 4.
77 See generally, Roberto Barontini & Lorenzo Caprio, The Effect of Family Control
on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT.
689 (2006); Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and
Management Affect Firm Value? 80 J. FIN. ECON. 385 (2006); Ronald C. Anderson & David
M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500,
58 J. FIN. 1301 (2003).
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firm.78 From an institutional point of view, this is exactly what we
would expect when a robust system like the family is used in a context
that lacks other competent ordering systems. Anderson et al. found
that, “[b]ecause of the unique incentives generated by long-term
commitments to the firm, undiversified portfolios, and familial
pressure, founding families appear to reduce agency conflicts
between the firm’s equity and debt claimants and thereby reduce the
cost of debt financing.”79 Others have found empirical support for
the arguments that family firms have more efficient channels for
informal decision-making80 and overall lower transaction costs.81 All
of these findings are consistent with an understanding that the family
brings an existing system of relationships, communication, and trust
into the mechanisms of corporate law and does not depend on the law
for its own operational efficiency. While this is partially recognized
in the way current corporate governance treats family relationships as
sources of interest conflicts, the systemic nature of the network is
generally ignored.
B.

The Family Firm in Asia

Although, as observed above, the family firm is prominent in
all major economies, there are particular historical reasons why this
form of business is particularly dominant in the private sectors of
Asian economies. Throughout history, Asia and the West have
followed very different paths of development. In Europe, the
incubator of Western culture, the core cultural institution of
Christianity weakened the extended family as a key social institution.
Grief observes:
This was achieved by such policies as prohibiting
marriages among kin . . . encouraging the donation of
78 Raphael H. Amit et al., The Role of Institutional Development in the Prevalence and
Value of Family Firms (Harv. Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 1507823, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507823 [https://perma.cc/ZZ5R-SNJX].
79 Ronald C. Anderson et al., Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt,
68 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 283 (2003).
80 Catherine M. Daily & Marc J. Dollinger, An Empirical Examination of Ownership
Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms, 5 FAM. BUS. REV. 117, 124 (1992).
81 Craig E. Aronoff & John L. Ward, Family-Owned Businesses: A Thing of the Past
or a Model of the Future?, 8 FAM. BUS. REV. 121, 122–23 (1995).
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one’s inheritance to the church, advocating consensual
marriages, and condemning practices that enlarged the
family, such as polygamy, divorce and remarriage. . . .
By the late medieval period, kin-based social
structures were no longer at the center of European
institutional complexes. The rise of alternative, nonkin-based social structures in such forms as
communes, guilds, fraternities, and universities is a
hallmark of this time. . . . [T]he relative absence of
both kin-based social structures and an effective state
in late medieval Europe led the Europeans to
progressively rely on corporations: non-kin-based,
self-governed, interest-based social structures.82
Grief offers detailed comparison of European and Muslim
development and shows that “[c]ollectivist cultural beliefs were a
focal point” in the culture of Muslim merchants, where kin-based
organizations thrived. In contrast, “individualistic cultural beliefs
were a focal point among the [European] Genoese,”83 where non-kinbased organizations thrived. The individual, as the basic social unit,
came to inhabit non-kin-based institutions, including the corporation,
at various levels within society.84
Like that of Muslim society, Asian history has differed
markedly from the institutional history of Europe in stressing
relationships over individuals.
Glenn explains: “East Asian
tradition . . . did not generate a notion of individual rights . . . [there
is a] refusal to conceptualize individuals in any other way than
relational—as children, parents, friends . . . and on and on.”85 This
state of affairs reflects the central teaching of Confucianism to focus
82 AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY 252 (2006)
(citing JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE 135
(1983) on the specific practices introduced.).
83 Id. at 281.
84 From his own conceptual perspective, Hegel describes how the members of a family
whose business is inserted into a corporation overcome the limits of self and family in order
to achieve a more honorable stance as member of the corporation. However, like the family,
the corporation ultimately inhibits the unmediated relationship between the individual and
the civil society and state. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 271–273
(Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991) (1820).
85 H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 337 (4th ed. 2010).
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on the “Five Cardinal Relationships” (wu lun) in which filial piety is
central. 86 Ruskola explains a difference in this regard on
interpersonal bonds. “[J]ust as contract is the paradigmatic form of
private ordering in [the American] legal system today, so family was
the ideological paradigm of traditional Chinese private ordering.”87
The family remains the central social institution, even in countries
that have experienced decades of communism, as the estimate that
family firms constitute about 85% of the Chinese private sector
business makes clear.88 Gatfield and Youseff go so far as to assert
that the “popularity and commonality of the Chinese family-owned
business is both an affront and a holistic challenge to the nature of the
three-fold societal structure and individualistic economic capitalism
of western modernity.”89 This particular assertion runs contrary to
data showing that, as in the West, Asian family enterprises tend to
outperform nonfamily firms, provided that control and cash-flow
rights are in balance,90 i.e., control is not achieved through a pyramid
structure or share classes allowing disproportionately low investment.
It is also true that just as the family can buttress corporate
governance and operations mechanisms, it can threaten them. As a
matter of system logic, it can be expected that when family integrity
and dynamism are congruent with the requirements of a given stage
of a given firm’s development, a family firm will be competitive. For
the same reason, if the motivations generated within a family were to
deviate from the needs of the business because, e.g., the family
system experiences a significant disruption, the family as secondary
system would then drag on the efficiency of the company. In Hong
Kong, the Li family that controls Cheung Kong Holdings and
86 Seok-Choon Lew et al., Confucian Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism in Korea: The
Significance of Filial Piety, 11 J. E. ASIAN STUD. 171, 175 (2011). “No other culture or
religion puts more meaning on family than Confucianism, because the Confucian family
carries the religious meaning of eternal life.” Id. at 179. “Individuals exist as parts
constituting the whole in the form of family—that is, as unity, not as independent units.” Id.
at 180.
87 Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2000).
88 FAM. FIRM INST., supra note 71.
89
Terry Gatfield & Mark Youseff, A Critical Examination of and Reflection on the
Chinese Family Business Unit and the Chinese Business Clan, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 153, 154
(2001).
90 Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large
Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2743 (2002).
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Hutchison Whampoa is not known for displaying family discord. The
founder, Li Ka-shing, who turned eighty-nine in 2017, has focused
considerable effort both on succession and the future of the family
firms by rationalizing the corporate group.91 One of Li’s competitors
in property development, the Sun Hung Kai Group, has been less
fortunate in family affairs. Following the death of its founder, Kwok
Tak-seng, his three sons Walter, Raymond, and Thomas took over the
company, but the oldest son was kidnapped and suffered trauma,
affecting his management of the company in subsequent years. 92
When the younger brothers (perhaps prematurely) stepped in to fill
the breach, at least one of them (Thomas) became involved in activity
with a government official that in 2014 earned him and the
government official prison sentences for bribery.93
The trial of Thomas and Raymond Kwok for bribery brought
two major Chinese value systems into contact. The trial was not only
the first of its kind in Hong Kong but was launched in the same year
that mainland China’s anti-corruption drive began.94 It is impossible
to say that this highly unusual action against one of Hong Kong’s
wealthiest families was in no way related to events set in motion by
the CCP in mainland China. Indeed, there has been some further
friction between the state and a prominent family. In 2015, Li Kashing was publicly criticized by a CCP publication for divesting from

91 See (1) Cheung Kong Reorganisation Proposal—Change of the Holding Company
of the Cheung Kong Group from Cheung Kong to CKH Holdings by way of a Scheme of
Arrangement, (2) Merger Proposal—(a) Proposed Acquisition by the Hutchison Group of
6.24% of the Common Shares of Husky in issue and (b) Proposed Share Exchange Offer to
the Hutchison Scheme Shareholders for the Cancellation of all the Hutchison Scheme Shares
by way of a Scheme of Arrangement, and (3) Spin-off Proposal—Proposed Spin-off and
Separate Listing of the Property Businesses of the CKH Holdings Group on the Stock
Exchange by way of Introduction (Jan., 9 2015). HKEXNEWS, http://www.hkexnews.hk/
(last visited June 30, 2016).
92 JOE STUDWELL, ASIAN GODFATHERS: MONEY AND POWER IN HONG KONG AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA 264 (2007).
93 See, e.g., Stuart Lau, Rafael Hui and Thomas Kwok Found Guilty of Bribery in Hong
Kong’s Biggest Graft Trial, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1665519/rafael-hui-and-thomas-kwokfound-guilty-bribery-hong-kongs-biggest [https://perma.cc/JW74-5YL3].
94 Brian Spegele, China Anticorruption Cases Have Quadrupled Since 2013, Study
Says, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/12/11/chinaanticorruption-cases-have-quadrupled-since-2013-study-says
[https://perma.cc/4XTRM4SB].
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China and reorganizing his group under Cayman Islands law.95 There
are certainly historical reasons why the CCP might find itself in
arguments with powerful bourgeoisie families, 96 but today the
structural arguments might be more powerful. Both families and the
CCP bring an external system of operations into a corporation whose
governance is designed to coordinate individuals divorced from such
systems. These two value systems are present in the controlling
shareholders of nearly every major company in China (including
Hong Kong). For this reason, among others, the CCP will be the other
major social system examined in this paper.
C.

Party Firms: Ideology and Ambition Transcending the
Immediate Profit Motive

Ruskola has observed that in China there are express
conceptual links between what society expects from extended
families and what it expects from the CCP.97 Today, most of the
largest Chinese corporations are owned by the People’s Republic of
China and controlled by the CCP, which directly controls the
appointment of senior management and indirectly controls their
policy choices for the company.98 These firms are some of the largest
in the world. 99 Like a family, a political party is not organized
95

Bruce Einhorn, The Tycoon Left Out in the Cold: China Accuses a Billionaire of
Forsaking the Fatherland, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-08/china-s-attack-on-li-ka-shing-spooks-hongkong-s-elite [https://perma.cc/6U3G-77UU].
96 Beyond the historical animosity between the two groups, the CCP has recently begun
a path similar to that of traditional corporate governance theory by viewing families as
inherently suspect because their alternative network offers tunneling potential to extract
benefits of control and transfer them to peripheral family members. See, e.g., Simon Denyer
& Xu Yangjing, China Vows to Tackle ‘Family Corruption’—But Even State Media Can’t
Hide Its Skepticism, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/29/china-vows-to-tackle-family-corruption-but-even-statemedia-cant-hide-its-skepticism [https://perma.cc/L8P2-W44Z].
97 Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and
Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2000).
98 Jiangyu Wang, The Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s StateOwned Enterprise 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 631, 651–660 (2014); Hon S. Chan, Cadre
Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998, 179 CHINA Q. 703,
704 (2004); MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 67–69.
99 According to Fortune Magazine, in 2015 Chinese state owned enterprises ranked as
follows on a global scale: State Grid (2nd in Global 500), China National Petroleum (3rd),
Sinopec Group (4th), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (15th), China Construction
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primarily to generate profits, and like a family, the roles, duties and
motivations within the network of a political party will not
necessarily be congruent with the scheme projected by corporate law.
Unlike a family, political parties involved in such management
activities are neither ancient (although they are long-standing)
organizations of humanity nor seen by the majority of existing
scholarship as having any positive impact on the company. As will
be discussed below, the relationship between the CCP and Chinese
SOEs is generally seen as contradictory, but with a system-oriented
theory of corporate law it need not be so.
In China, the state is the ultimate owner of most of the
country’s largest commercial, industrial and energy enterprises, with
its holdings managed by the Chinese central government’s StateOwned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee
(SASAC).100 These enterprises currently exist as stock corporations,
the result of a process of “corporatization” undertaken in the 1990s.101
Although many of them are listed on stock exchanges in China and
abroad, SASAC retains a controlling interest in these SOEs. While
the executive managers of such companies are duly appointed in
conformance with shareholder vote under Chinese company law,
decisions regarding the nominees for such positions are made by the
CCP’s Central Personnel Committee, which MacGregor calls
“without a doubt the largest and most powerful human resources body
in the world.”102 As explained in the Joint Opinions on Strengthening
and Improving Party Building Work in Central SOEs, the Central
Personnel Committee must participate in “the appointment,
management and supervision of all SOE officers above the middle
level.”103 The Committee will examine the candidate’s qualifications
and deliberate on their possible appointment, then “the appointment
Bank (22nd), China State Construction Engineering (27th), Agricultural Bank of China
(29th), Bank of China (35th), China Mobile Communications (45th). Global 500, FORTUNE
(Aug. 19, 2016), beta.fortune.com/global500 [https://perma.cc/25DT-XEFU].
100 The list of firms held by SASAC. SASAC, Yangqi Minglu (ཞԱᖅ) [List of
State-Owned Enterprises] (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/
index.html [https://perma.cc/SV94-UFLL].
101 Wang, supra note 98, at 646 (noting that the project of corporatization was
undertaken in tandem with the promulgation of China’s first Western-style companies act in
the modern era). See also WANG, supra note 30, at 6.
102 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 69.
103 Wang, supra note 98, at 658 (providing the translation used here on Joint Opinions
on Strengthening and Improving Party Building Work in Central SOEs).
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of the candidates by the board of directors [will take place] based on
the recommendations of the Party Committee, following all legal
procedures and formalities.”104 When CCP members are appointed
to positions by a CCP screening committee, we must assume that
Party principles will be an important determinant of the way that
these appointees interact with each other and the company. Like the
family, the CCP presents a system defining interpersonal
relationships, so that corporate actors will not meet the traditional
expectation under corporate law of individually autonomous profitdriven actors within the firm.
Wang refers to this mix of CCP control and corporate
formalities as “a system of corporate governance that features two
parallel structures, one for legal governance and the other for political
governance.”105 Wang argues that CCP policies are carried into the
corporate behavior of the SOEs through four channels: (i) members
of the CCP are required to follow party philosophy and policies; (ii)
the CCP appoints party members to the executive management
positions within the SOEs; (iii) party cell meetings are conducted
regularly by SOE employees at various levels; and (iv) because the
CCP has its own disciplinary channels for party members, these
channels also apply to party member executives in SOEs. 106
McGregor puts it more cryptically, citing a lawyer who advises
Chinese state firms: “‘In corporate law, the boards [of Chinese state
companies] can choose to disregard the Party’s advice. As a fact of
life, they cannot.’”107
Viewed from the perspective of systems theory, one can see
how the presence of the CCP within a corporation gives corporate
actors dual roles and duties, so that one system intermingles with and
influences the other. The CCP has its own ideological position, and
this does not always correspond to profit maximization or
“shareholder value.” Wang explains that within Chinese society, a
key aspect of CCP legitimacy is providing economic stability and
prosperity, and that the SOEs are a tool in this process through
directing the use of economic resources, implementing industrial
104

Id. at 659.
Id. at 648.
106 Id. at 652.
107 MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 49 (quoting a securities lawyer familiar with Chinese
companies).
105
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policy and even collaborating in Chinese foreign policy. 108 In
following government policies, the SOE could be understood to carry
out a very general form of socially targeted corporate sustainability,
or corporate social responsibility (CSR). McGregor sees this as a
clear disadvantage: “Far from being driven solely by making a profit
for shareholders, the Party had to act in accord with social ‘stability’
and national ‘macro-economic’ policies laid down by the
government.” 109 He further notes, “[t]he corporate animal that
emerged from the protracted and painful birth of China Inc. was a
strange new beast . . . it was both commercial and communist at the
same time.”110 Wang offers a concrete example of SOE behavior
diverging from pure profit motive; following major earthquakes,
SOEs have been called upon to “participate in the rescue efforts by
providing services and materials”111 to quake victims.
Such socially oriented philosophy has also led to atypical
patterns in executive compensation. Executive managers given stock
options when an SOE prepared for an IPO often did so with an
understanding within the CCP that the options were not to be
exercised. MacGregor notes that these executives were deprived of
“huge windfalls” generated by rising stock prices, and quotes the
dilemma as expressed by someone close to the situation: “‘These
executives say, I have added value, so I should be rewarded,’ said a
Chinese banker. ‘The Party says, you have added value because we
put you there.’”112 This approach to executive compensation would
be extremely rare in a Western company, but after the global financial
crisis began in 2007, it has been an approach that is increasingly
considered.113
The “parallel structures” of corporate governance found in
Chinese SOEs present “a new model of SOE governance that
combines universal elements of corporate law with communist
political institutions.”114 McGregor well sums up how this model
108

Wang, supra note 98, at 660, 661.
MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 52.
110 Id.
111 Wang, supra note 98, at 663.
112
MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 102.
113 See, e.g., Steven A. Bank et al., Executive Pay: What Worked? (UCLA School of
Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 16-11), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2812349 [https://
perma.cc/DY6N-UVL6].
114 Wang, supra note 98, at 667.
109
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might be grasped by the international capital markets when he
characterizes expressions of policy loyalty as cronyism, “timely
genuflections at the feet of the Party by officials, and indicative of
political loyalty and reliability, both essential to a career in public
life.”115 Wang asks the more academic, and probably more pertinent,
question as to whether “this experiment will be successful and
sustainable.”116 There are some signs that history could be moving
favorably in the Chinese direction. The Western model of executive
compensation has been shown to present significant problems.
General support for creating a socially sustainable philosophy of
company law is growing. Western countries use tax law to encourage
all individuals (including corporations) to participate in charitable
activities such as disaster relief.
When the systematic unity of a network of values—like that
promoted by a political party—is incorporated into corporate law, the
contradiction between maximizing individual profit and maximizing
general systemic welfare (or merely executing a party platform) can
be mitigated. As will be explained in Part IV, lawmakers have been
generous (and generally successful) in bringing the values of the
financial system into the rules governing the corporate form. Similar
accommodations can be made for other systems of value, whether the
family, a political party, or a philosophy of social values pursued by
corporate founders.

IV.

ADJUSTING CORPORATE LAW WITH STRUCTURAL
COUPLINGS

A.

How Current Corporate Law Flexibly Accounts for Its
Environment

1.

Individuals Adhering to Rules Constituting a Single System

What is possibly still the leading theory of the firm
understands corporate law as establishing a framework within which
individuals meet and transact through a “nexus of contracts” to create

115
116

MCGREGOR, supra note 11, at 67.
Wang, supra note 98, at 669.
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their respective rights and duties. 117 While differing political
positions argue that rights, duties and the benefits of corporate
operations should be attributed differently among the various
corporate constituents, neither law nor theory in the leading traditions
of company law 118 provide for wholesale interaction of alternative
systems of value within the company.119 Persons with power under
corporate law (usually directors, but also including controlling
shareholders and executive management, depending on the
jurisdiction) must act in the best interests of the company or some
constituent thereof and avoid conflicts of interest.120 Such conflicts
are expressed in terms of self-interest, which is extended to cover
links to systems (such as other companies or the family) where an

“Indeed, one can see corporate law in general as effectively a delegation to the
legislature and the courts of the continual reformation and reinterpretation, as circumstances
and strategies change, of the indefinitely long-term relational contract among a corporation’s
shareholders, managers, and creditors that is constituted by the corporation’s charter.”
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of History for Corporate Law,
YALE L. & ECON. RES. NO. 449, Aug. 2011, at 14. See also PALGRAVE-MACMILLAN,
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISE AND PROSPECTS (2012); Cheffins,
supra note 49, at 13 (citing MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF
THE STATE 62, 67 (2013)).
118 There are good arguments supporting the view that the German corporate law
framework is already systemic in its view that duties run to the overall “enterprise”
(Unternehmen). See MERTENS & CAHN, supra note 49, §§ 76, 33, 37 (3rd ed. 2010). Indeed,
the relational value of rights is deeply imbedded in modern German law. The German
constitutional guarantee of property right, for example, is already systemic in its basis:
“Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed . . . . Property entails obligations.
Its use shall also serve the public good.” GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art. 14. (Ger.),
translation at https://www.bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dc
d/basic_law-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DK4-MWVV].
119 An argument can also be made that when Hansmann and Kraakman refer to “the
political power of the various interest groups” vying for predominance within the corporate
entity, they imply that each of these groups brings its systematic network of values into the
fray. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at 13. Although this does give insight into
the play of power and the reasons for influence enjoyed by any given corporate constituency,
it does not examine the manner in which various elements of each value system interact. As
such, their theory does not focus on the interaction of systems within the corporate form.
120 In all major jurisdictions, directors must avoid or declare any interest that conflicts
with that of the company. With respect to directors, see, e.g., DGCL, supra note 40, § 143–
144,; Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, §§ 172–173, 145–177, 182; HKCO, supra note
65, § 536 (H.K.); David Chien v. Francis Cheung, [2013] H.K.E.C. 896 (noting that with
respect to controlling shareholders, the duty is found in the US jurisdictions.); Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Company, 460 P.2d 464
(Cal. 1969).
117
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interest can be found.121 These systems thus become visible only as
a manifestation of an individual interest of a corporate actor
influenced by them. Law acknowledges one system, the company
itself. Other networks of systematic value are not recognized as such,
with a few exceptions. When the conflict comes from a source
beyond the individual corporate actor, it will be attributed to that actor
if the type of relationship is deemed capable of channeling the
interest.122 The remainder of the network through which the interest
is channeled rarely falls within the contemplated coverage of
corporate governance rules.
2.

The Exceptional Role of the Financial System

The accommodations within corporate law to allow the
company’s smooth connection to the financial system are pervasive
and deeply embedded in the structure of the corporation as governed
by law. As such, these features need not be announced and are often
121 DGCL § 144 extends its rule on conflict of interests in company transactions to an
interest held by, “any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in
which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial
interest.” DGCL, supra note 40, § 144. Sections 175 and 177 of Companies Act 2006 also
apply to conflicts of interest that are “indirect” although they do not refer to interests of a
person that is “connected” with a director, where “connected” expressly includes family
members. Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, §§ 252–253. For provisions regulating a
company’s extension of credit to directors, Companies Act 2006 § 200 includes such
connected persons, which encompasses family members. Hong Kong company law is
similar in this regard. Its provisions regulating extension of credit to a director apply to loans
to a “connected entity,” and these entities include nuclear family and persons cohabiting with
the director. HKCO, supra note 65, §§ 486, 500–503. However, the realities of businesses—
such as banks and international firms providing expatriate employees with housing—are
addressed in a detailed set of exceptions to the prohibition, which allow loans to be made in
connection with ordinary business or employee housing schemes. HKCO, supra note 65, §
509 (exception for home loan), HKCO, supra note 65, § 510 (exception for leasing goods
and land), HKCO, supra note 65, § 511 (exception for transaction entered into in ordinary
course of business). Such balancing of power, prohibition, and exception is exactly what we
would expect, given that corporate law provides society with an artificial construct for the
convenience of associated undertakings of entrepreneurs and investors. The remaining
question is then why the Ordinance does not provide a more articulated set of options for
attributing interests between family members.
122 The law’s understanding of exactly what can channel an interest is far less
substantiated than it could be. Historically existing aggregations of common economic
interest (family, company and partnership) are included automatically, while other
aggregations long recognized in sociology and economics (club, class and school networks)
would have to be alleged and proven. Suspicion of political party influence is found in
economics and corporate law scholarship, but not in the law itself.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

2016]

CONCEIVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

125

taken for granted. The stock corporation is conceived theoretically
and organized legally as a means of concentrating the financial
investments of many contributors into a single entity through public
issue of shares in that entity. 123 In this way, corporations could
expand their capital beyond a size achievable by a small group of
wealthy partners. The financial system, like other systems, has its
own internal needs. Members of this system interact to make
payment transfers, allocate capital, manage financial affairs and
provide tools to manage risk. 124 The capital allocation and risk
management functions require a limit on volatility for the value of
assets they trade, “liquidity” through the ability to transfer such assets
with satisfactory immediacy to others, and a cap on the amount of
uncertainty arising from the risk of fraud by market participants or
issuers of securities.125 The legal form of the stock corporation was
designed and has over the years been repeatedly adjusted to meet
these needs.
At the level of design, stock corporations have basic features
recognized in most jurisdictions: legal personality, investor
ownership, limited liability, transferable shares, and central
management.126 Four of these characteristics are closely tied to the
needs of secondary market trading in negotiable instruments, a
market that is much older than even the early stock corporations.127
Corporate shares are transferable by default, 128 and these shares

See, e.g., 1 PALMER’S COMPANY LAW § 1.1 (Geoffrey Morse ed., 2016); FRANKLIN
A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATE LAW 19–34 (2d ed. 2010); PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 11 (8th ed. 2008); EILIS FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 3 (2008); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1–4 (1986); ADOLF
A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
11–17 (revised ed. 1968); 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 2 (1931).
124 See Kay, supra note 67, at 203. Other influential lists of main activities for the
financial system have of course been created. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE,
COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 25–45 (2000); Ross Levine, Financial Development and
Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688, 717–720 (1997).
125 See, e.g., MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING AND THE FUTURE
OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 204–225 (Kindle ed. 2016).
126
See ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, supra note 10, at 9–19 (containing a
discussion of other sources).
127 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 100–101 (1992).
128 The shares of “private” companies in the U.K. tradition cannot be freely offered to
the public. See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 755. In Hong Kong, express
123
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evidence ownership interests in a separate legal entity that in turn
owns its own assets and whose ability to pay liabilities is not tied to
the assets of individual owners, thus shielding the company from
claims against its owners and the owners from claims against the
company.129 This furthers the stability of the value of traded shares.
Rules in connection with the fifth characteristic, central management,
allow financial investors to protect themselves against the radical
uncertainty arising from human behavior, such as fraud.130 These are
the rules of which alternative systems such as families and the state
habitually run afoul, but the rules are rarely breached when action is
taken to protect financial actors because those actors are the intended
beneficiaries of the rules.131
Over the years, this basic company structure designed for
complementarity with the needs of the financial system has been
amended to augment such complementarity. Action intermediated by
duties and the threat of litigation was understood as an overly indirect
and expensive way to insure that managers behave in a way that
brings the best results to financial investors. A solution offered was
to bring the action of the financial system directly within the
relationship between management and the company by making
management themselves financial market investors. 132 Executive
compensation was redesigned in the 1980s to compensate
management with stock and stock options, aligning the interests of
management and financial market investors. 133 Companies were
correspondingly given the power to issue derivative products in the
provisions must be included in the company’s articles of association restricting transfer of
shares in such companies. HKCO, supra note 65, § 11.
129 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1333 (2006).
130 This is the central “agency problem” discussed in corporate law theory. See, e.g.,
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 78–82.
131 The results of this structural characteristic in corporate law has been discussed from
a different angle with significant effect in LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
132 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—The Role of
Competition and Compensation in Building Silicon Valley (University of Maryland Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2006-442006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=940022 [https://perma.
cc/2APT-GU5A].
133 See Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from
a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099 (2010); Bank, Cheffins &
Wells, supra note 113, at 8–9.
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form of options on their own shares. Other changes were made to
facilitate financial investors to bid up the price of a company’s shares,
turning control of an entire company into something that could be
easily traded. 134 This was done by introducing codes and laws—
formulated by or meeting the needs of financial investors—to prevent
management from impeding a hostile takeover of the company. 135
Pagano points out that in Continental Europe, the presence of labor
organizations and families as concentrated alternative networks
within companies checked the evolution of the company toward an
object of transfer on the financial markets.136
Finance extends beyond equity investment. In order to
mediate between the needs of two types of financing parties,
shareholders and creditors, shares are sold for a specific amount, with
the payment remaining as capital in the company for the protection
of creditors, and this share capital may not be paid out to shareholders
as dividends. 137 In company law following the U.K. tradition, a
unique form of security interest called “charges” were developed in
corporate law to protect secured lending, and these charges were
given properties allowing them to fluidly self-adjust from “floating”
to “fixed” through a process referred to as “crystallization,” which

134 Kay, supra note 67, at 840–854 (discussing Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 110 (1965)). On
the interests backing the creation of takeover rules, see John Armour & David A. Skeel Jr.,
Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?: The Peculiar Divergence of US and
UK Takeover Regulation , 95 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1727 (2007).
135 See The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, The Takeover Code, Rule 21 (2016)
(U.K.).
136 “In the European case, case, the personality of the business corporation was saved
from its “thingness” by its identification with the fate of the family dynasty and by the
countervailing powers of the unions.” Ugo Pagano, Economic Things, Legal Persons and
Hybrid Business Corporations 24–25 (Feb. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
137 A number of issues have arisen over the years in these two forms of investor
protection. One is the gradual elimination of the concept of “par value” in some jurisdictions,
which is not seen as reducing the amount of share capital available for creditor protection.
Another is the elimination of a required “minimum capital” in the United States, but not in
Europe, and the debate on whether minimum capital does protect creditors. A third
adjustment of rules on sale of shares under value in connection with granting stock options
for managers and other employees of the company. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C.
COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 228–
230 (10th ed. 2010); BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J., JR. HANKS, MANNING’S LEGAL CAPITAL
(3rd ed. 1990).
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enables a creditor instantly to scoop up the entire aggregate of an
enterprise’s assets upon occurrence of a specified credit event.138
Such rules restrict the freedom of the company to finance
itself as opportunity arises and also can restrict its ability to comply
with contractual obligations to constituents such as employees, but
the restriction has been traditionally viewed as a source of freedom:
any protection of the interests of financial investors is deemed
fundamentally salubrious for the company’s development. 139
Moreover, where the needs of the financial system advise exceptions
to these rules, such exceptions are routinely implemented. Thus,
although using share capital to pay for new shares offered to new
investors can be understood to damage both earlier investors (who
made real capital contributions) and creditors (who do not want
capital depleted through distributions to shareholders), the
underwriting industry expects a fee for its service, so that offering a
discount on an issue of shares to pay such fees can be understood as
valuable.140 The pattern of reasoning used—facilitating the financial
system’s connection to companies strengthens such companies—is
dominant in corporate law policymaking, so paying the fee to
financial actors is actually considered a savings rather than a
transaction cost because the focus is placed on the funding gained
rather than the fee paid. We introduce significant modifications into
corporate law to stimulate such access to finance despite the fact that
a successful company might well finance itself cheaper and better
through revenue from ongoing operations.141 Even when connection
with the value system of the financial markets is not the best choice
for a company, such companies still must operate within a basic
structure that was designed to accommodate such connection.

138

See National Westminster Bank Plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd., [2005] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 680.
The link between investor protection and corporate growth has been made by Rafael
La Porta et al., supra note 66.
140 Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 553; HKCO, supra note 65, § 14.
141
See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 67; Kay, supra note 67. Some distinction is already
present in corporate law between the minority investor protection in listed or public
companies and that in unlisted, private and closely held companies. However, at least in
U.K. and U.S. state corporate law statutes, there is no deeply embedded distinction in the
nature of the corporate form for those that will seek outside financing and those that will not.
139
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Equitable Duties are Doors to Alternative Value Systems

When a court applies the duty of care to the action of a
corporate director, deciding whether it was undertaken with
“reasonable care, skill and diligence”142 or “on an informed basis, in
good faith,”143 the court must necessarily draw values from systems
in the social environment beyond law that determine the relationship
of an actor to an action or a contracting party. Moreover, in both the
United Kingdom and Hong Kong, the company law expressly
requires that a director exercise the “the general knowledge, skill and
experience that the director has,”144 which requires an examination of
skills brought from the environment into the company. This has led
to decisions that consider practices in industries such as the taxation
of international trusts 145 and the management of firms engaged in
derivatives trading.146 In Delaware, the requirement that directors act
“on an informed basis” is generally fulfilled if they are fully briefed
by a financial institution in a way that meets industry standards.147
Although the financial system may be the related set of values in the
environment most commonly brought into corporate law to determine
whether a duty has been fulfilled, there is no limit on the sets of skill
and standards that could be injected into corporate law for such
purposes.
“Equitable Considerations” Are a First Step in Systemic
Accommodation

4.

In Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and a number of
jurisdictions of the Commonwealth, law provides minority
shareholders with a remedy if the affairs of the company have been
142
143
144
145
146

Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 174(2)(a); HKCO, supra note 65, §465(2)(a).
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984).
Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 174(2)(b); HKCO, supra note 65, §465(2)(b).
Norman v. Theodore Goddard, [1991] BCLC 1028 (U.K.).
Chintung Futures Ltd (in Liquidation) v. Arthur Lai Cheuk-Kwan [1994] 1 H.K.L.R.

95.
147 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A 2d 946 (1985), directors were found
to have acted on an informed basis because “The board then received a presentation from
Peter Sachs on behalf of Goldman Sachs & Co. (Goldman Sachs) and Dillon, Read & Co.
(Dillon Read) discussing the bases for their opinions . . . show[ing] slides outlining the
valuation techniques used by the financial advisors, and others, depicting recent business
combinations in the oil and gas industry.”
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conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff shareholder
(individually or as a class). 148 The activity complained of is not
“misconduct”—i.e., a breach of the law or a duty—but rather an
action by persons controlling the company that contravenes some
(spoken or unspoken) arrangement reached among members.149 This
differs from the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders under
Delaware law 150 because it looks to the actual constellation of
relationships within the company in order to understand whether such
an arrangement exists. While breaches of formal contractual
arrangements are included in the sources of this action, the more
common situation is where some course of dealings among the parties
have created an understanding for which it is equitable to bar
contravention of the arrangement. These equitable considerations
arise primarily in connection with understandings among family
members and persons in a ‘quasi-partnership’ relationship.151 That is,
they arise when shareholders have agreed that a second system of
values will operate within the company parallel to the rules
established by corporate law.
A recent case in which violation of equitable considerations
arising from a family relationship was found to trigger unfair
prejudice shows how corporate law can be made to accommodate a
second systems within its rules of governance. In 2015, the Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeals held that patterns of behavior among
two brothers created equitable considerations supporting an action for
unfair prejudice.152 A company’s founder built up an international
corporate group from 1930 until 2004, when he died. His two sons
had worked with him for decades managing the group. Following the
father’s death, the younger son began skillfully to maneuver to
exclude his brother and his brother’s offspring from management and
other benefits of control, increasing distributions to himself, his heirs
and companies they control. All of this was legal. The Court made
clear, however, that the family relationship as it existed during the
148

Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 994; HKCO, supra note 65, § 724.
In re Saul D. Harrison & Sons Plc., [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (U.K.).
150 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (1994)
(stating that a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to a corporation only if it owns a majority
interest in the corporation, or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation).
151 O’Neill v. Phillips, [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (U.K.).
152 Yung Kee Holdings Ltd., FACV 4/2015 (C.F.A. Nov. 11, 2015) (Legal Reference
System) (H.K.).
149
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founder’s lifetime established an expectation that the older brother
would be included in company decision-making regardless of his
shareholdings, so that subsequent actions of the defendant brother
unfairly prejudiced the plaintiff. 153 The values expressed in the
family system created the framework that the court enforced through
this action. Corporate law could accommodate such secondary
systems in other ways as well.
B.

Coupling the Users of Corporations into Corporate Law

If expectations generated by the family as secondary system
intersecting with corporate law can be used to ground a personal
action against another shareholder in corporate law, there is no real
structural impediment to bringing such systems more actively within
the corporate law framework. The notion of “equitable consideration”
on which the unfair prejudice action is based can be understood as an
existing “structural coupling” in corporate law between the legality
established by the law and the patterns of behavior established by the
family using the corporate form. In the Yung Kee decision, discussed
above, it is very unlikely that the court would have considered an
increase in the company’s earnings per share as a mitigating
circumstance to the prejudicial exclusion of the older brother from
management. Expanded use of such couplings would allow users of
the corporate form whose motives are influenced by systems such as
families or a political party to operate within the company without
running afoul of its design generally privileging the individual profit
motive and more specifically the needs of the financial investor. The
following paragraphs provide examples that remain more theoretical
than practical in nature.
1.

Legitimizing Family Use of the Corporate Form

As discussed in Part III, family firms are known to favor
values such as autonomy, longevity and culture, and the family
network brings with it properties like alternative channels of
communication and agency bonding through relationships of loyalty.
It is possible to couple such values into the governance structure of
153

Id. ¶¶ 54–56.
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corporate law without major structural adjustments. An amendment
of the law to allow directors to incorporate such values into board
decision-making could be formulated very much like a typical
constituency protection provision. The U.K. Companies Act contains
the beginnings of such a provision, expressly allowing directors to
take into account the interests of the likely consequences of any
decision on “the interests of the company’s employees,” “the need to
foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers
and others,” and “the impact of the company’s operations on the
community and the environment,” among other things.154 Although
the first subsection subordinates such aims to promoting “the success
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole,” the second
subsection allows a corporate purpose as stated in the articles of
association to set out different goals.155 Such purposes could include
any particular value or cluster of values held to be important by the
family using the particular company. In this way, a family member
director could act to promote a family value without a conflict of
interest just as a shareholder director may not act to promote the value
of shares without fearing condemnation for conflict of interest.
If values important to a family were incorporated expressly in
the object of a company or in other provisions in the articles of
association or incorporation, they would additionally have an
affirmative (rather than just a protective) function, achieving
somewhat broader accommodation of the family into the corporate
form. Hong Kong law gives the articles of association the force of a
contract under seal among all members and the company,156 so that
family aims and practices could be enforced by direct action against
any member and any director (for failing to cause the company to
comply). A similar action is available against directors that act
outside of the stated object of the company.157 Patterns of behavior
existing in gaps between such express declarations but necessary to
carry them out could then constitute equitable considerations on
154

Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 172(1).
Companies Act 2006, supra note 34, § 172(2) (“Where or to the extent that the
purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other than the benefit of its members,
subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the
benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes”).
156 HKCO, supra note 65, § 86. A provision with like effect is found in Companies Act
2006, supra note 34, § 33.
157 HKCO, supra note 65, § 116(3).
155
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which an action in unfair prejudice—or a specially devised action—
could be based.
The adjustments discussed above to couple family and
corporate form would allow significant progress in accepting the
family as a legitimate user of the corporation. Actions influenced by
family aims would no longer constitute conflicts of interest, and thus
would have achieved a status similar to the aims expressed in the
financial system. Like financial system imperatives, family aims
could also be positively pursued and this pursuit would have an
avenue of enforcement. However, to reach the proper level of
accommodation, the structure of governance should also be adjusted.
Under Hong Kong law, the selection and tenure of company directors
is provided for in the articles of association. The law itself in most
cases refers to “directors” rather than “board of directors” when
defining their powers and duties.158 With this enabling framework, it
should also be possible to constitute a supervisory board and
management board dichotomy in the articles of association to manage
the company. The supervisory board could be selected from family
members using any method these members see fit to incorporate into
the articles and the management board could either be selected by the
supervisory board or by a vote of all shareholders (including both
family and non-family participants), or some other method. The
supervisory board would constitute a structural coupling between
family decision-making and company management.
In addition to accommodating a family network through
adjustment of corporate purpose and organization of governance, the
equitable fiduciary duty and duty of care should be open to
adjustment. This could be achieved through either statute or case law.
The key to the inclusion of an alternative system like a family within
the corporate form is that the relationship arising from the
environmental system should be permitted to influence the behavior
of corporate actors to the extent necessary for the internal operation
158 For example, a search of the HKCO shows only four uses of the term “board of
directors,” each time referring to the power of a holding company to influence the board of
its subsidiary. By contrast, the nearly 400 other references to board action or acts by
individual directors use the term “directors” or “director.” For example, in ascribing the
duty of informing shareholders of the state of the company before each annual general
meeting, the law uses the phrase, a “company’s directors must prepare for each financial
year a report.” HKCO, supra note 65, § 388.
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of the relevant system. Values embodied in such environmental
systems should be considered on a par with the values of such systems
as the secondary market for securities. If a company director were to
take action to increase the share price—even if only temporarily—it
would likely be evaluated as wholly positive under existing corporate
law, even if all benefit were to go to traders in the secondary market,
rather than to the company or its stable members.
The law should thus account for the particular, systemic logic
of management behavior in a family, just as it would import
principles from accounting, finance or any other appropriate body of
organized knowledge recognized as relevant under corporate law.
Just as a director’s decision might be judicially validated if made to
save a company tax payments is taken under best-practice advice by
a competent financial institution, or seen to reduce the risk against the
default of a counterparty, so too should duties allow strategic
rationale from a family system in order to protect company values,
such as to preserve autonomy, preserve a given culture, or reduce
succession risk at times of generational handover.
2.

Legitimizing the CCP in Chinese SOEs

As discussed in Part III, Chinese SOEs currently operate
under rules of corporate governance very similar to those used in any
major system of corporate law.
Nevertheless, members of
management are selected by the CCP and expected to carry out
broader social policies set by the CCP. These parallel planes of
governance operate without any particular method of mutual
accommodation or even transparency regarding their existence.
Particularly because the CCP governs China as a fully sovereign
country with control over its legislative process, this contradiction
between law and practice is both unusual and unnecessary. Structural
couplings similar to those discussed above for the family could be
easily incorporated into corporate law, and nothing but the
disapproval of international investors could hinder China from doing
so.
First, the company law could be amended so that directors
could be both allowed to follow CCP policy without fear of breaching
a duty to the company and also required to do so. Second, if policies
set by the CCP are recognized as objects of the company, affirmative
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actions available to members would exist to ensure their enforcement,
both against directors and—through an action similar to unfair
prejudice—against shareholders. This would allow China to sell
control of SOEs without abandoning the company’s commitment to
CCP policy. Third, the existing two-tier board structure of Chinese
companies could be used to create a structure in which CCP members
populate one board that then controls the population of a second
board, which could be opened up to any qualified manager. As
mentioned above, because China is a sovereign with control over its
own laws, only market disapproval could prevent China from making
such changes to its law.
The model of company law China has accepted is designed
for use by the financial system, and investors would certainly prefer
that this remain the only system beyond corporate law that is allowed
to shape the corporate form. Particularly in light of the probability
that the large Chinese SOEs do not finance themselves primarily on
the financial markets, 159 but though revenues from ongoing
operations, a continued primacy of the financial system over Chinese
company law seems unjustified. While international investors may
at first impression find such accommodation dangerous to their
interests, they should understand that such exercise of power in any
case exists, and its exercise within an orderly and transparent
framework brings not only dignity to the Chinese state (which
currently bends the law in a dubious manner), but also predictability
and transparency for investors.
If China as sovereign were to undertake such amendments,
they could be made neutral to a system, so that both families using
private firms and the CCP using SOEs could employ the corporate
form without being hampered by the inherited subordination of
corporate law to the needs of the financial system.

159 A sample of ten prospectuses issued by major SOEs in connection with their initial
public offerings shows that six planned to use the proceeds to “strengthen their capital base,”
another had no plans for the funds, and only three expressed any intention to actively invest
the proceeds or pay down debt. The six companies that injected the funds into capital were
China Construction Bank Corporation, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd, Bank
of China Limited, China Life Insurance Company Limited, Ping An Insurance (Group)
Company of China, Ltd.; the one with no plans was Tencent Holdings Limited; and those
with concrete uses for the funds were PetroChina Co Ltd, China Shipping Container Lines
Co Ltd, and China Telecom Corporation Limited.
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CONCLUSIONS

Corporate law in its current form is surprisingly rigid and
blind to the other systems of value that operate in interlocking
relationships within companies as essential parts of the corporate
environment. These systems are recognized in corporate law
primarily to the extent that they influence a corporate actor, and such
influence is often condemned as a conflict of interest. When the stock
corporation is conceived as a closed system with only the most
marginal recognition of the various value networks intersecting with
it, the corporate form becomes far less useful than it could otherwise
be. This state of affairs is particularly disturbing in Asia where most
companies are operated by families. In China, a very significant
number of the largest firms in the economy are owned by the state
and guided by the CCP. If we take the theoretical step to understand
corporate law as a system, the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann
allows us to create “structural couplings” that can be introduced
between corporate law and systematic networks of value such as
family, the state, or a political party.
To begin the exercise of coupling corporate law with its
environment, this paper has singled out two ideologically opposed
examples—the commercially active family and the CCP within
Chinese SOEs—as social systems of value that make use of the
corporate form to pursue commercial ends. The values of such
systems are not always congruent with the rights and duties provided
for in traditional corporate law, which have been designed mainly to
facilitate and protect trading in corporate shares on secondary capital
markets. Such fundamental features of corporate law like legal
personality, limited liability and transferable shares exist in order to
meet the needs of the financial system. While protection of investors
in such markets is a goal that should be taken into account, it should
not be overvalued. For large companies, initial public offerings may
be of little use as a source of finance, and their utility as a form of
prestige and advertising must be balanced against the pressure the
IPO generates for short-term focus. The goals of the controlling
shareholders operating a company’s planning in the markets for
products and services are much more important for a corporation’s
viability than the needs of secondary market traders. Secondary
market traders make no capital contribution to the company except
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the promise of liquidity, and this promise actually serves financial
investors themselves more directly than it does the capital costs of the
issuing company and the financial position of its controlling
shareholders, who in most cases have no plans to engage in active
trading.
Particularly in light of the fact that the corporate form has
been repeatedly adjusted to the needs of the financial markets, it is
highly unusual that changes have not yet been made to allow efficient
use of the company by organizations such as families, whose driving
logic does not always accord with the prevalent logic of corporate
law. Further adjustments can be made to accommodate other systems.
Both the measure of skills in the duty of care applied to directors and
the equitable considerations used to determine whether a company
has been operated in an unfairly prejudicial manner are examples of
structural couplings linking corporate law to the surrounding
environment.
In the same way, the duties of directors and the objects of the
company can be adjusted toward systemic aims of the family or a
political party like the CCP to couple their needs with corporate law.
Moreover, the arrangement of management organs can be easily
adjusted in the Hong Kong legal system (where such organs are
shaped in the articles of association) or in mainland China (whose
legal system is controlled by the CCP) to introduce a dedicated board
for family or party members to meet and make decisions. In China,
the fact that corporate law reflects the financial-market-focused
model leads to distortions of corporate governance, which creates a
significant and troublesome discrepancy between law-on-the-books
and law-as-enforced. The only barrier to the Chinese government
enacting corporate law that allows for efficient use of the corporate
form by its SOEs or family firms is the displeasure of international
investors and the perceptions of market quality that track their
interests.
Beyond family firms and SOEs, the same use of structural
couplings could integrate CSR or governance design for corporate
sustainability deeply within the operation of a corporation. This work
could be pursued within the same systems theory model of analysis.
If corporate law continues to disregard deep-seated and powerful
value systems that interlock with most of the corporations operating
globally, and those calling for a more socially responsible corporate
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form do not look to systemic change, the corporate form will remain
inefficient for its users and overly supportive of its own
financialization. An adjustment of the basic architecture, however,
could trigger substantial synergies between such systems and the
company.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

